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Essays
Representation and Capital Punishment
The Lawyers' Art: "Representation" in
Capital Cases
James M. Doyle*
Representation is an art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional
in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another.
Strickland v. Washington'
* James M. Doyle is a criminal defense lawyer in Boston, Massachusetts, where he is Deputy
Chief of Counsel for the Public Defender Division of the statewide Committee for Public
Counsel Services. He is a graduate of Northwestern University School of Law and holds an
LL.M. degree from Georgetown University Law Center, where he was an E. Barrett Prettyman
Fellow. He is the author (with Elizabeth Loftus) of EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL (2d ed. 1992), and of a number of articles focused on race and criminal justice, most
recently, 'It's the Third World Down There?' the Colonialist Vocation in American Criminal
Justice, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 71 (1992); Into the Eight Ball: The Colonialists' Landscape
in American Criminal Justice, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 65 (1992); and The Innocent Black
Defendant: Two Stories, 1 RECONSTRUCrION 132 (1992). He has served as volunteer post-
conviction counsel for Georgia Death Row inmates since 1986.
1. 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
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In the age of Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud, representation has thus had
to contend not only with the consciousness of linguistic forms and
conventions, but also with the pressures of such transpersonal,
transhuman, and transcultural forces as class, the unconscious, gender,
race and structure. What transformations these have wrought in our
notions of formerly stable things such as authors, texts, and objects
are quite literally unprintable, and certainly unpronounceable. To
represent someone or even something has now become an endeavor
as complex and as problematic as an asymptote, with consequences
for certainty and decidability as fraught with difficulties as can be
imagined.
Edward Said2
The United States Supreme Court maintains that a jury's vote for
a death sentence can embody the community's individualized moral
judgment on a particular person.' But what if lawyers in a capital
case cannot produce an authentic portrait of the defendant for the
jurors to evaluate? What if this is as true of good lawyers as it is of
bad lawyers? If lawyers cannot provide this portrait, who will? What
if an "authentic" portrait does not exist? Without such a portrait, isn't
a reliable, individualized capital sentencing process an illusion?
When good death penalty lawyers argue against the death penalty
they begin and end with the fact that most death row inmates have
been subjected to the services of very bad lawyers indeed. Stephen
Bright, the Director of the Southern Center for Human Rights,
epitomizes this approach in his essay, Counsel for the Poor: The Death
Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer.4 Bright
presents a Homeric catalogue of condemned inmates who were
represented by drunken lawyers,' by sleeping lawyers,6 by crazy
lawyers, by lawyers who referred to their client as "a little ole nigger
man,'"7 and by lawyers whose incompetence amounted to virtual
disorientation
2. Edward W. Said, Representing the Colonized: Anthropology's Interlocutors, 15 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 205, 206 (1989) [hereinafter Representing the Colonized].
3. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198
(1976).
4. Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but
for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1832 (1994).
5. Id. at 1835.
6. Id. at 1843 n.53.
7. Id. at 1865; see also Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 805 n.13 (11th Cir. 1982) ("little
old nigger boy").
8. See, e.g., House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608, 619 (11th. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870
(1984) (noting that defendant's lawyers had not read new death penalty statute).
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The transcripts of many capital trials are offensive to conscientious
professionals. And as a tactical matter it is hard to quarrel with
Bright's focus on inadequate representation: It is a vivid way to
illustrate the vulnerabilities of the death penalty system. Besides, the
performance of trial counsel is one of the most influential factors in
the process by which a handful of homicide defendants is selected for
execution. For anyone hoping to make some concrete improvement
in the fairness of the capital punishment system, achieving a better
level of defense services is almost certainly the most promising place
to start.9 Still, fascination with the shortcomings of bad lawyers
obscures a deeper issue. What do good lawyers do when they
"represent" a death penalty client?1"
9. Report of Malcolm Lucas to ABA Task Force on the Death Penalty, 40 AM. U. L. REV.
195 (1990).
10. The Supreme Court recognized that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee
a defendant the right to counsel in criminal cases in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Although it was generally assumed that the right to counsel meant the right to "effective"
counsel, various courts expressed the standard for "effectiveness" differently. See Trapnell v.
United States, 725 F.2d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 1983) (commenting on experience with "farce and
mockery" of justice as standard for ineffective counsel); Note, Identifying and Remedying
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752 (1980). The Supreme Court defined the
federal standard in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1983). Strickland was a capital case,
and the issue was not the defendant's guilt or innocence, but his counsel's failure to raise
mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of the trial. The language of the standard announced
in the Court's opinion ("reasonably effective assistance of counsel") was not particularly
controversial; even Justice Brennan, a perennial dissenter in death cases, joined the relevant
portion of the opinion. Id. at 702.
There is an extensive body of commentary addressing ineffective assistance of counsel in
general and ineffective assistance in capital cases in particular. This literature generally accepts
the Strickland Court's assumption that bad lawyers will create unreliable sentencings, good
lawyers reliable ones. See, e.g., Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon Defense
Lawyering in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 245 (1990-1991); Bright, supra
note 4; Gary Goodpaster, The Trial For Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 229 (1983); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The
Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986); Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a
Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 77 GEO. L.J. 413
(1988); Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1923 (1994); Ivan K. Fong, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital
Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 461 (1987). A specialized body of literature, generally by and
for practitioners, directly addresses the question of what a good lawyer should do. See, e.g.,
NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR
CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION (1995); NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER AS-
SOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES (1987, amended 1988); MILLARD FARMER & JAMES KINNARD, TRIAL OF THE
PENALTY PHASE (1981); Dennis M. Balske, New Strategies for the Defense of Capital Cases, 13
AKRON L. REV. 331 (1979); William J. Genego, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel:
Performance Standards and Competent Representation, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 181 (1984);
Andrea D. Lyon, Defending the Death Penalty Case: What Makes Death Different?, 42 MERCER
L. REV. 695 (1991); Kevin McNally, Death Is Different: Your Approach to a Capital Case Must
Be Different, Too, THE CHAMPION, Mar. 1984, at 32. See generally ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE
APPOINTMENT & PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (1990). A particular-
ly acute effort in this genre is William Geimer, Law and Reality in Capital Penalty Trial, 18
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 273 (1990-1991). A comprehensive review of these two lines
of comment, the general and the particular, is provided in Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance
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Lawyers in a capital case "represent" their client in two ways. They
represent him in the familiar sense of speaking for him," of
providing a representative. But they also "represent" their client by
shaping and presenting to a judge or jury a representation of the
client. It is in this second sense of "representation," expressing the
relationship between a copy and an original, that good lawyers face
difficulties of their own. American lawyers-even the best-operate
in an adversary system concerned primarily with describing past
events, not with portraying people. Adversary presentation ordinarily
resolves questions of historical fact-What happened? Who did it? In
what state of mind?-that only incidentally require inquiry into
character. When a defendant's character is proved, it is usually
because his character provides circumstantial evidence of his deeds,
not for its intrinsic interest.12 The traditional issue is "Did he do the
crime?" not "Is he otherwise worthy of life?" But the most dangerous
aspect of capital sentencing is not the lawyers' unfamiliarity with this
broader focus; it is the fundamental nature of the process of repre-
sentation.
When Edward Said writes that representation is "as complex and
problematic as an asymptote,"' 3 he chooses an image that succinctly
captures the problem. An "asymptotic" curve approaches a line more
and more closely as it extends into infinity but will never meet it. A
copy can resemble an original more and more, but it can never
achieve identity with it. The consequences of this property of
representation are an abiding issue in philosophy,14 philology, 5 and
of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323.
The Strickland Court does not mention the ramifications of the truism "other people are
difficult to know." Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Strickland simply assumes that
people can be known and described, and that to whatever degree people are difficult to know
or describe, capable adversary advocacy will improve the situation to the point of "reliability."
In effect, the Strickland opinion assumes that an effective plea for mercy and a reliable portrait
are the same thing. This Essay is meant to challenge that assumption.
11. Throughout this Essay I use the masculine pronoun when I refer to criminal defendants.
This choice is not entirely arbitrary. Men greatly outnumber women on death row, and while
many general observations concerning the process of representation would apply equally to men
and to women, the particular history of the representation of women in our culture warrants
separate treatment. See generally THE REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN FICTION (Carolyn
Heilbrun & Margaret Higgonet eds., 1983). When I say "he" or "him" I mean "he" or "him."
Because many of the best capital defense lawyers are women and capital defense lawyers
generally work in teams, I have used plural pronouns to refer to the defenders.
12. See generally 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 62, 192-218 (Chadboum rev.
1970); Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845 (1982).
Moreover, character evidence is generally offered one trait at a time (e.g., "honesty" to support
credibility), not as a comprehensive portrait of an individual.
13. Representing the Colonized, supra note 2.
14. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, Poetics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE: THE REVISED
OXFORD TRANSLATION (Princeton University Press 1984); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE AR-
CHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Pantheon 1972); MARTIN HEIDEG-
GER, BEING AND TIME (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., Harper 1962); MARTIN
4
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literary criticism. 16 In most accounts of representation, "[t]he
representative or substitute is thus qualitatively different from the
original, in part because an original is itself and is not contaminated
by its difference."' 7 Indeed, some go so far as to say that- it is
impossible to know whether an "original" exists, when everything is
mediated by representations.
18
I will not try to summarize the dense and extensive commentary on
the question of representation; I simply want to draw attention to its
existence.' 9 For my purposes it is not necessary to choose the view
of Plato, or Foucault, or Derrida, only to remember their shared
conviction that a writing is not the thing written about, a theatrical
performance is not the event it ostensibly recreates, and to apply it to
the question of whether the trial portrait of a capital defendant is or
can be the defendant in any useful sense. The practice of many disci-
plines, anthropology for one, has been radically altered by the
awareness that language is not a "transparent medium through which
HEIDEGGER, POETRY, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT (Albert Hofstader trans., Harper & Row 1971);
Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Falsity in an Extra-Moral Sense, in 2 COMPLETE WORKS OF
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE (M.A. Mogge trans., Russell & Russell 1964); PLATO, REPUBLIC, Book
X (B. Jowett trans., Prometheus Books 1986). For recent surveys of the issue's development, see
ALAN MEGILL, PROPHETS OF EXTREMITY: NIETZSCHE, HEIDEGGER, FOUCAULT, DERRIDA
(1985); S. Halliwell, Aristotelian Mimesis Reevaluated, 28 J. HIST. PHIL. 487 (1990); D. Merwick,
Postmodernism and the Possibilities of Representation, 31 AM. STUD. INT'L 4 (1993).
15. See, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Spivak trans., 1976);
JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (Alan Bass trans., 1978).
16. See, e.g., ERICH AUERBACH, MIMESIS: THE REPRESENTATION OF REALITY IN WESTERN
LITERATURE (Willard Trask trans., 1968); see also Michael Bal, Telling, Showing, Showing-off,
18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 556 (1992); Michael Holquist, The Last European: Erich Auerbach as
Precursor in the History of Cultural Criticism, 54 MOD. LANGUAGE Q. 371 (1993).
17. Edward W. Said, Criticism Between Culture and System, in THE WORLD, THE TEXT, AND
THE CRITIC 200 (1983) [hereinafter Criticism].
18. See FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE
CAPITALISM 93-96, 119, 179 (1991). I find this argument illuminating, even persuasive, but I
want to make it very clear that my criticism of the prevailing death penalty scheme does not
depend on it. The standard justification for the death penalty is invalid unless both of the
Strickland Court's assumptions are correct. For the Strickland Court's reasoning to survive,
people in general must be knowable and describeable, and lawyers must be able to know their
clients and reliably describe them for jurors in the specific forensic context. Readers who are
skeptical of the post-structuralist position in its most sweeping form should still consider its
validity in the specific case of lawyers' effectiveness.
19. The primary justification for publishing this Essay is that doing so may provoke an
examination of these issues by people better qualified than myself. My interest in these questions
arose during the course of representing death row inmates in state and federal post-conviction
proceedings, not out of any preexisting grasp of the vast literature on representation. I do not
want to pretend that my own knowledge in that area is anything other than primitive. It will be
only too clear that my perspective is a working defense lawyer's, not a scholar's. Among the
differences these perspectives imply is the fact that I am using the term "representation" rather
loosely, in its dictionary sense: "an image, likeness, or reproduction in some manner of a thing."
2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2498 (compact ed. 1971). In philosophy and criticism, the term
itself is a contested one, used differently by different writers. See, e.g., MEGILL, supra note 14,
at 209.
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Being shone."2 Clifford Geertz describes the recognition this way:
The capacity of language to construct, if not reality "as such"
(whatever that is), at least reality as everyone engages it in actual
practice-named, pictured, catalogued, and measured-makes of
the question of who describes whom, and in what terms, a far
from indifferent business. If there is no access to the world
unmediated by language (or anyway by sign systems) it rather
matters what sort of language that is. Depiction is power. The
representation of others is not easily separable from the
manipulation of them. 1
The transparency of the "language" of adversary presentation in
capital sentencing is generally assumed.2 But is adversary process,
even in the hands of its most dedicated and accomplished prac-
titioners, ultimately as helpless as anthropology in the face of the
challenges posed by representation?
This is a critical question. Throughout a capital trial, good lawyers
painstakingly construct a representation that substitutes for the
defendant. But if the jury votes for death, that process will be
reversed. At an execution, a representation does not suffice, and the
actual defendant will replace the representation the jurors evaluated.
According to the Supreme Court, the validity of the death penalty
derives from the fact that a death sentence embodies the community's
individualized moral judgment on a particular defendant.' That
judgment depends on a reliable-and more or less
transparent-relationship between the representation of the defendant
20. Representing the Colonized, supra note 2, at 206.
21. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, AFTER THE FACT 130 (1995).
22. This is not the case with regard to the more familiar problem of the guilt/innocence
phase of an ordinary criminal trial. See, e.g., W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN,
RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN
CULTURE (1981); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 173 (1983); Anthony Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing
Arguments to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 55 (1992-1993); Milner S. Ball, The Play's the
Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric of Theatre, 28 STAN. L. REV. 81
(1975); Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the Adversarial
Criminal Process-A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal for Reform, 32
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743 (1994); Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality,
18 VT. L. REV 681 (1994).
23. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976)
(plurality opinion). While many of the issues raised by the problem of representation are
relevant to ordinary, non-capital sentencing proceedings, their radical impact on death senten-
cing practice is unique. A non-death sentence is constitutional so long as it is "proportional":
that is, consistent with a range or class of sentences for the same crime, or for defendants
possessing similar criminal records. Solem v. Helms, 463 U.S. 277, 289-91 (1979). The validity
of a death sentence raises different Eighth Amendment issues because it depends on in-
dividualized moral judgment for its justification. Mandatory death sentences are illegitimate, no
matter how despicable the crime, or how horrendous the defendant's record. Blystone v.
Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990). The jury must still be free to consider any aspect of the
defendant's character. Penry, 492 U.S. at 319.
422
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that the advocates present to the community and the individual
defendant himself. But is it really true that "effective" lawyers will
naturally produce individualized sentences? Can the relationship
between a representation of a defendant and the defendant himself
ever be transparent? This issue must be explored by reviewing the
best lawyers at their best, not the worst lawyers at their worst. Bad
lawyers are a challenge to the death penalty system in operation. Are
good lawyers a challenge to the death penalty system in principle?
I. THE ACTOR AND THE ACT
Modem capital trials unfold in two phases. In the first phase, the
jurors determine guilt or innocence in a conventional murder trial. If
the jurors find the defendant guilty of murder, they determine in a
second phase whether the defendant will be sentenced to death. This
second phase will meet constitutional requirements only if it provides
a vehicle for a unique, wide-ranging inquiry into every aspect of the
defendant's character or history that could be offered in mitigation.
The two phases are separate, but there is no firewall between them.
It is axiomatic that lawyers who will be seeking mercy at the penalty
phase of a trial must be wary of the portrait of their client that they
paint during the guilt/innocence phase.24 Frequently, there is tension
between the strategic goals in the two phases: The most promising
guilt phase defense-for example, alibi-can present the most
problematic penalty phase situation if it fails. Having found that the
defendant was lying about his alibi at the guilt phase, why should a
juror believe, or even care about, his tales of child abuse at the
sentencing phase? A "he didn't do it" guilt phase defense undermines
the defense "he's sorry he did it" at the penalty phase.2' Careful
lawyers preparing to portray a capital defendant recognize that the
exigencies of the guilt phase curb their freedom to represent their
client. Some representations will have become impossibilities by the
time the guilt phase is over. But the influence of the guilt/innocence
phase on the representation of the defendant does not end with the
elimination of a few defense options at the sentencing phase.
At a capital trial, several representations of a defendant compete
for a juror's assent. The prosecutor's representation appears first. This
position is crucial, and the defense lawyer's performance cannot be
discussed sensibly without a few general observations about the
24. See White, supra note 10, at 356-58.
25. Lyon, supra note 10, at 708. The guilt phase may also provide the opportunity to sow
the seeds of "residual" doubt concerning the defendant's guilt, enhancing the chances of a life
sentence. See generally William Geimer & Anthony Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote for Life or
Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1988).
19961 423
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prosecution's approach. The prosecutor's representation is announced
in the charging document, leaked to the media, outlined in the
opening statement, and manifested throughout the prosecution's case-
in-chief. Ordinarily, the prosecutor's representation of the defendant,
although it will be reinforced in the penalty phase, will be complete
by the end of the guilt phase. A juror will see everything that follows
through the lens that the prosecutor's guilt phase presentation
provides. Few prosecutors will neglect this opportunity. How will they
use it?
Prosecutors will pose, and then answer, a grisly version of Yeats'
question, "How can we know the dancer from the dance?" To the
question "How can we know the murderer from the murder?" the
prosecution answers, "You cannot, and you should not try."
Prosecution representations of defendants during the guilt phase
(which may occupy three weeks or more of the trial) will attempt to
collapse the actor into the act. What sort of person is the defendant?
He is the sort who would commit this murder.
True, prosecutors will make adjustments to the facts of individual
cases. For example, capable prosecutors will try to anticipate and
foreclose aspects of the defense lawyers' representation. If it seems
likely that the defense will try to portray the defendant as the
follower in a leader/follower murder, the prosecutor will emphasize
the defendant's active role in the crime during the presentation of the
prosecution's guilt/innocence case. If the crime was especially bloody,
or the defendant unusually brazen, the prosecutor will certainly
emphasize those facts. But the fundamental actor-into-act strategy will
be operating beneath the surface details. This helps to explain why
the existence of a paragon/victim is a luxury, not a requirement, for
a death penalty prosecutor. Unremarkable victims can make the crime
seem emblematic. They can seem very much like the jurors them-
selves: It was just the victim's appalling luck to have intersected with
the defendant at the wrong moment.26 It could have been anyone.
The prosecutors do not spend any more time than is absolutely
necessary in proving a bad motive or intent. Sometimes the absence
of comprehensible motive-the sheer stupid pointlessness of the
killing-is the prosecutor's most effective tool. Because the crime is
almost random it can evoke jurors' generalized fears where a crime
26. Robin West, Narrative, Responsibility and Death." A Comment on the Death Penalty Cases
from the 1989 Term, 1 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161 (1990), notes in discussing the
Supreme Court's recounting of death penalty trials that "[t]he striking, horrifying, and unifying
feature of these murders, as narrated by the majority, is that they are all, essentially, chance
encounters between strangers, in which what is casually exchanged happens to be death." Id. at
170. In my view, the same can be said of the trial transcripts from which the Court's opinions
derived.
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that is entangled in a specific purpose might not. Besides, the
prosecutor would rather not distract the jurors from the central point:
The death penalty is called for not because the defendant yielded to
a particular evil need on this specific occasion, but because the crime
was in the defendant's nature; anything could have triggered it. The
circumstances are not responsible; the murderer is responsible.27
Some murder by this murderer could have been predicted all along.
In the crime, the true defendant finally and comprehensively revealed
himself.
I mention these themes because they create a situation very
different from that which the adversarial tradition ordinarily
confronts. The traditional criminal trial presents two mutually
exclusive choices: The prosecution proved he did it, or the prosecution
did not. The prosecution generates all the inculpatory facts and
inferences and challenges any potentially exculpatory facts and
inferences. The defense does the reverse. The result is a surplus of
"facts" (real or alleged), inferences, and stories,' from which the
jurors choose. Two versions of the event emerge; the jury accepts one
and rejects the other, or supplies its own synthesis.
In capital sentencing trials the two sides seldom join issue in
exactly this way. Because the defense in a capital case conveys a
broad presentation of the defendant's character, a demonstration of
capacity for life, while the prosecution seeks only to emphasize the
horror of his act, the presentations are asymmetrical. The prosecution
concentrates on one brief, vivid incident; the defense reviews an entire
life.29 The defense always offers some positive representation of the
defendant. The prosecution (although it will heap scorn on the
defendant's version) is under no pressure to offer a detailed counter-
representation of its own. The prosecution knows it can withstand any
representation a defendant offers so long as it can argue that beneath
that representation abides the murderer as manifested in his crime. A
prosecutor can be content if a capital defendant appears in silhouette:
violent, effective, powerful. The defendant becomes absorbed into the
jurors' imaginative experience of murderers from Cain in the Old
Testament up until the morning's newspaper.0 The archetypal figure
of the murderer supplies much of the meaning in the prosecutor's
representation of the individual on trial.
27. Id. at 171-72.
28. See Amsterdam & Hertz, supra note 22.
29. White, supra note 10, at 361.
30. Northrop Frye makes this point about archetypes in literature generally in NORTHROP
FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRMCISM 100 (paperback ed. 1971). See also Dwight L. Greene, Justice
Scalia and Tonto: Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance and the Myth of the Colorless Individualism, 67
TUL. L. REv. 1979 (1993); Nunn, supra note 22, at 751-52.
1996]
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II. How WE "HUMANIZE"
Professor Welsh White, after surveying the best of the capital
defense lawyers, reports their view that, "[i]n every case, the capital
defendant's attorney should seek to 'humanize' the defendant."31
The term is not the Orwellian insult to the defendants that it appears
to be; it is a realistic acknowledgment of the rhetorical power of the
prosecution's position. Unless defense counsel act, their client's
humanity will be obscured by the prosecutor's representation. "Actor-
into-act" is the prosecutors' theory of representation; "humanizing"
is the defenders'.
There is a consensus among accomplished death-penalty lawyers
about the process of "humanizing." Good capital lawyers collect all
of the information-school records, medical history, family memories,
the defendant's own accounts-that bear on the defendant's
humanity. 2 They then present this information in as compelling a
form as possible in a "case for life."33 This is good representation, at
least in one sense.
Missing from this summary is the fact that the two stages of
"humanizing" also implicate all of the problems of "representation"
in its second sense. When good lawyers scour the defendant's past for
records and accounts of the defendant, they are not collecting
immutable facts expressed in transparent language; they are collecting
representations of the defendant. When they present the case for life
by selecting aspects of the defendant's past for presentation, they are
constructing a representation of their own. Defense lawyers inevitably
are both consumers and creators of representations.
This doesn't mean that all penalty-phase lawyering is equally futile.
There is a range of performance available to lawyers in each of these
roles. Some lawyers will be much better consumers of representations
than others: more energetic in seeking out prior versions of the
clients, more imaginative in recognizing their value, better critics of
the images they are offered. Some lawyers will be much better
creators of representations than others: more sensitive to their
audience, more perceptive about their client's plight, better able to
mobilize the resources of the forensic setting to communicate their
representation to the jury. It is not true that there is no higher level
to which one can aspire in capital sentencing advocacy. The differen-
31. White, supra note 10, at 361.
32. Id. at 340-52. As one capital defense lawyer remarks, "You've got to become your
client's biographer." James Traub, The Life Preserver, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 8, 1996, at 47,
49 (quoting George Kendall, staff attorney, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund).
33. White, supra note 10, at 360.
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ces between lawyers' performances at the opposite poles of this range
are far more substantial than could be predicted by quantitative
measures of effort expended.
At the high end of the performance range, lawyers might even
vindicate Martha Nussbaum's belief that if one is able to "vividly
experience the concrete particulars of another's life, imagine what it's
like to live that life and, at the same time permit yourself the full
range of emotional responses,"34 then, as Phyllis Goldfarb puts it,
"[T]he merciful, gentle, and patient attitude that you will naturally
develop will not permit you to treat that person callously or in-
humanely., 35 In other words, in presenting the defendant to the jury,
lawyers might try to act less like lawyers, more like novelists, painters,
directors: in short, more like artists. Perhaps the apparent choice
between the two roles is a false choice. Perhaps one could combine
them: use the lawyers' tools and the artists' tools. Both could help the
jurors see that the defendant's role in the murder and the protections
against his future dangerousness warrant a life sentence.
This combination of the artists' and the lawyers' tools may or may
not be good courtroom strategy. Professor Nussbaum notes that "this
stance does not determine any particular outcome" even if "it is
frequently connected with mercy in sentencing."36 Even so, it is
helpful to keep the combination in mind as a possibility while thinking
about capital cases. If nothing else, reference to the artists' methods
is a reminder that neither artists nor lawyers are engaged in a
straightforward, mechanical process of reproduction. Inevitably, both
are vulnerable to distortion by, among other things, power dynamics
and cultural stereotypes. I will try to illustrate the intervention of
these forces by discussing recurrent challenges to capital defense
lawyers. I've selected three from among many: first, the power-
saturated nature of the materials that counsel will have available;
next, the need for lawyers representing African-American defendants
to defeat prevailing racial stereotypes; finally, the pressures on lawyers
representing the mentally ill to fit their clients into preexisting
caricatures. These examples do not exhaust the list of barriers to
"transparent" representation, but I hope that they can begin to
indicate the scope and the intractability of the problem.
34. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND
LITERATURE 3 (1990).
35. Phyllis Goldfarb, A Clinic Runs Through It, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 65, 68 (1994).
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III. RELATIONSHIPS OF TRUST: ARTISTS AND MODELS
Capital defense experts assert that the cornerstone of any effective
defense presentation is a "relationship of trust"37 between the lawyer
and the client. The emerging standard of care in capital cases requires
that lawyers convince their clients to trust them.
But trust them to do what? Are the lawyers trusted to present the
most truthful representation of the client? No criminal lawyer will
accept an obligation to display the complete, unvarnished "truth"
about a criminal defendant. The most attractive? Most attractive to
whom? Attractive to the jurors, the lawyer, or the client? The client
may see his exposure as mentally retarded or sexually abused as
unbearably painful; the lawyers may see such exposure as the only
hope for the client to escape the death penalty. Are the lawyers
trusted to save the client's life at any cost? By any means? Or trusted
to allow him to face a death sentence with dignity or integrity?
It is no criticism of the lawyers who have written about this issue
to point out they do not offer any general answer. After all, the
medical profession has wrestled with a version of these problems
throughout its history without resolving the tensions inherent in the
treatment of people in life-threatening situations. Hippocrates'
injunction, "first do no harm," is a good place to start, but in a
context such as capital sentencing, where harms come in many forms
and from many directions, and where one-death by execution-is so
appalling, the Hippocratic oath can only take one so far. Most good
lawyers feel that they should take every conceivable step to save their
clients' lives while helping the clients cope with any aftermath.38
Implicit in the good lawyers' answers is their determination that no
trial will ever result in a choice between life and dignity if they can
help it. But most would probably agree that in theory, some version
of the choice could arise and the proper response to the choice could
vary from case to case. Even lawyers who generally believe that "life
at any cost" is the right approach can imagine that at some point,
some case could become so hopeless and some client could be such
a self-aware individual that "death with dignity" would be an
appropriate goal. Besides, the question will rarely present itself as the
stark decision "death versus dignity"; it will be a "slightly enhanced
37. White, supra note 10, at 374-75.
38. At least this seems to be implied by the emphasis on the lawyers' duty to persuade (as
forcefully as necessary) the defendant to the lawyers' course that provides an element of the
"evolving" standard of care. See, e.g., Michael Mello, On Metaphors, Mirrors & Murderers,
Theodore Bundy and the Rule of Law, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 887,912 (1990-1991);
White, supra note 10, at 371-72.
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chance for mercy versus a somewhat less respectful portrait." The
specific terms of the relationship have to remain somewhat
provisional.
Ultimately, what the lawyers need from the "relationship of trust"
is the freedom to make these choices when they do arise. (And
frequently, they arise in tactical settings that require an immediate
response.) What the lawyers offer in return is the promise not to
abuse their freedom. As in the physician-patient relationship, feelings
of trust may develop in the attorney-defendant relationship, but
whether trust develops or not, there is always a fundamental relation-
ship of power. The best capital defense lawyers are scrupulous, ethical
people: They have not sought this power for its own sake and they do
not enjoy their possession of it, but they do have it. It is pointless to
pretend otherwise. Their phrase "relationship of trust" is a statement
about two different things: the desirability of ordinary decency in
human behavior and the pragmatic advantage of lawyers' possessing
both every revelation that the client can offer and the authority to
employ them as the lawyer determines best. It looks as if there is a
relationship of trust when the client tells the lawyers everything they
want to know and the client follows the lawyers' advice, but behavior
that counterfeits this situation would arise from a relationship of
absolute hegemony and abject surrender.
Other disciplines acknowledge a "crisis in representation" because
they recognize the dangers that hide in any process in which the
strong describe the weak, the dominant culture describes the subor-
dinated one. In psychologists' representations of their patients, or
anthropologists' representations of native societies, the representations
"bear as much on the representer's world as on who or what is
represented."39 Does this warning echo in the context of capital
sentencing?
A capital defendant's encounter with his defense lawyers is never
the client's first experience of being represented by a person of higher
status; usually it is only the most recent in a very, very long series of
such experiences. Most capital defendants-because of race, poverty,
mental disability, youth, illiteracy, pathological family background, or
some other reason-have spent their lives in subcultures of people
who seldom represent themselves. When do members of these groups
attract the attention of the dominant culture in a way that will leave
some record? Where will lawyers find the paper trail of a capital
39. Representing the Colonized, supra note 2, at 224. For comment on representation in
psychiatric accounts, see SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS (James Strachey
ed. & trans., Basic Books 1958); MEGILL, supra note 14, at 321-32. See generally STEVEN
MARCUS, REPRESENTATIONS: ESSAYS IN LITERATURE AND SOCIETY (1975).
1996]
13
Doyle: The Lawyers' Art
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1996
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 8: 417
defendant? They will harvest school, probation, military, medical, and
work records. Every one of these sources will describe an encounter
that revolved on an axis of power and implicated professional needs,
conventions, categories, and stereotypes. The best lawyers will leaven
these official documents with family memories, but the family is an
institution that is far from innocent of power and its implications. The
relationship between a father and a son is about more than power,
but it is inescapably about power too. Sometimes a father represent-
ing a son can be as problematic a representer as a boss evaluating a
worker. And what of a son representing himself to a father? That
representation, itself, provides one source of the father's version.
A gigantic literature addresses these issues,4° but let me describe
one critique of representation from the social sciences. In Weapons of
the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, James C. Scott
explores a Malaysian peasant village and assesses the claim that
ethnographic accounts comprise a "full transcript" of peasant life.41
Scott carefully demonstrates how anthropologists can mistake various
peasant behaviors-lateness, footdragging, unpredictability, noncom-
munication-for intrinsic elements of their culture, when in fact these
behaviors are resistance strategies designed as protections against
external modernizing pressures (with which the peasants would
probably associate anthropologists). Is it not likely that similar
strategies were played out when the African-American defendant was
interviewed, as a child, by the white guidance counselor? When the
sexually abused defendant was interviewed by his juvenile probation
officer? The confusions that Scott describes are not exotic
phenomena; they are to be expected. Scott's peasants employed the
classic defenses of the vulnerable in the presence of the strong:
The fact is that power-laden situations are nearly always
inauthentic; the exercise of power nearly always drives a portion
of the full transcript underground.... [T]he normal tendency will
be for the dependent individual to reveal only that part of his or
her full transcript in encounters with the powerful that it is both
safe and appropriate to reveal. What is safe and appropriate is of
course defined rather unilaterally by the powerful. The greater
the disparity in power between the two parties, the greater the
proportion of the full transcript that is likely to be concealed. 42
40. See generally W.J.T. MITCHELL, ICONOLOGY: IMAGE, TEXT, IDEOLOGY (1986); HANNA
PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1968).
41. JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT RE-
SISTANCE 200-04 (1985); see also ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE COLONIAL ENCOUNTER (Talal
Asad ed., 1973).
42. SCOTT, supra note 41, at 286. It seems to me that in the extreme context of capital
defense representation these power-driven distortions will affect even lawyers who are fully
430
14
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol8/iss2/3
Doyle
The illiterate, the mentally ill, the retarded, the abused, the poor, all
the members of all of the outcast and stigmatized groups learn to
depend on concealment, dissimulation, noncooperation.
Capital defense lawyers cannot extricate themselves from this
dynamic. They will always be dependent to some degree on earlier
representations of the defendant. In the specifics of the encounter
between the lawyer and the client and in the contrasting cultural
situations that formed their lives, the lawyers are placed in the
dominant, the clients in the subordinate, position. Power, as such, is
only one of many forces that intervene in representation. How many
of us know ourselves well enough to describe ourselves comprehen-
sively to another? How many of us have never chosen to represent
ourselves differently to different people, or to the same people in
different situations? In collecting their clients' histories, capital
defense lawyers are collecting impressions of the clients formed in
complex incidents charged with conflicting elements. Even very good
lawyers will see their clients through a haze of "transpersonal,
transhuman, and transcultural forces [such] as class, the unconscious,
gender, race and structure."43 The depth of the haze will vary, but
even a quite passionate desire to pierce its veil' is unlikely to
succeed entirely.45
These problems are magnified by the fact that trial lawyers depend
on a second "relationship of trust." It is a primordial commandment
of trial advocacy that advocates must win and hold the trust not only
of the clients, but also of the jurors.' 6 It is axiomatic that a jury must
first trust a lawyer to trust that lawyer's case. Volumes have been
written to explain to lawyers how they should speak, dress, even feel,
to create this effect.4 7 For now it is probably enough to say that the
committed to the models of practice described by such works as Stephen Ellman's The Ethic of
Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEo. L.J. 2665 (1993), or Charles Fried's The Lawyer as
Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976). Even
where friendship is a fact, not a metaphor, a situation in which one friend inherits the
responsibility for saving (or losing) the other's life will necessarily influence their behavior.
43. Representing the Colonized, supra note 2, at 206.
44. Indeed, there may be nothing beneath the veil. Many have argued that no "pure" human
identity exists beyond these social forces. See generally JAMESON, supra note 18.
45. For example, what European seemed to identify himself more closely with a subor-
dinated group than T.E. Lawrence? Lawrence risked his life in the Arab Revolt and attacked
the British for the Revolt's betrayal. But read Lawrence now with the problem of representation
in mind and it is hard to miss the extent to which in Lawrence's hands the Arabs' story became
Lawrence's story; the Orient's disappointment became Lawrence's disappointment. See EDWARD
W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 241-44 (1979). To Arab eyes, Lawrence, for all of his fervid dedication
to the Arab cause as he saw it, now looks to be an arch-Orientalist and his writing about Arabia
seems to be a paradigm of distortion. See, e.g., SULEIMAN MOUSA, T.E. LAWRENCE: AN ARAB
VIEW (1966).
46. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 133 (1986).
47. See, e.g., ANTHONY AMSTERDAM ET AL., TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF
CRIMINAL CASES § 335 (ALI-ABA Joint Comm'n on Continuing Legal Education, 3d ed. 1974).
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sum of this mountain of advice is that the lawyers cannot stray too far
from the accepted wisdom of the prevailing culture. Lawyers who
appear to think themselves "better than" the jurors (or who just seem
weird) are very unlikely to persuade them. Standing in front of a jury,
arguing, "Here's something you have never thought of' is a trial
lawyer's nightmare. Lawyers' rapport with a jury is carefully built
during the course of a trial, and lawyers are painfully aware of the
fact that it can vanish in an instant. Lawyers have a mediating role."
That role is enough to thrust even lawyers who could somehow detach
themselves personally from the prevailing culture back into its
gravitational field.49
The constraint imposed by the jury is more important than it seems
because the two elements of "humanizing" are not consecutive. For
the sake of clarity, I've been writing as though, first, the lawyers
collect all of the facts, and, only then, begin to shape their own
representation. Actually, the two processes of humanizing are
concurrent. While the lawyers are collecting the representations of
others, they are at work on their own, or at least on two or three
rough alternative sketches. The job of collecting is active, critical,
selective: The lawyers are looking over their shoulders at the jurors
while they are collecting.5" It is possible only in theory (and perhaps
not even there) to "know everything" about a client's background.
The fraction that the lawyers do learn is a result of their work: They
ask some questions, not others; they follow some leads, let others
drop. What they find is shaped by what they are seeking. The lawyers
sense a range of representations-a common catalogue of
images-that a juror might consider worthy of mercy. The lawyers
also anticipate the prosecutors' armory of responses to particular
representations: some so devastating that they can obliterate the
jurors' trust in the defenders and doom their client. Some lawyers
might see this range as broader, or richer than do others, but no
competent lawyer can stray beyond a range.
Within that range, the best "humanizing" lawyers will select,
organize, and present their materials in ways that can be fairly and
usefully thought of as literary.51 The fact that the originals of the
lawyers' representations exist in the real world does not change this.
As Raymond Williams has pointed out, even works that insist on their
roots in everyday reality-works such as Orwell's famous essay,
48. Clark Cunningham, Lawyer as Translator, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992).
49. See Nunn, supra note 22, at 800-02.
50. See generally White, supra note 10, at 340 (assuming that "investigating for mitigating
evidence" must suppose preexisting understanding of what is mitigating).
51. See Goldfarb, supra note 35, at 68.
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Shooting an Elephant-can be profoundly literary in their conception
and in their execution.52 When Andrea Lyon recommends that
capital lawyers "[g]et personal records and objects from the family
such as photographs, report cards, favorite books, or even a baseball
mitt, '5 3 she is repeating Henry James' advice to novelists:
"Dramatize! Dramatize! 5 4 Lawyers who follow this advice will be
doing more for their clients than lawyers who do not. Here, as
elsewhere, Professor White's "evolving standard of care" in capital
defense shows improvement over routine approaches by providing a
more vivid, empathetic portrait of the defendant. But the usefulness
of the literary model can extend only so far.
"Humanizing," when it is pursued with all the talent, technique and
energy that the best lawyers can deploy, will help the jurors see the
defendant as a human. In defending any murder case, this is a difficult
and important step in the right direction. But will this talent,
technique, and energy enable the jurors to see this human? The
nature of the sentencing process turns on the second question, and
confronted with that question, the artist/lawyer analogy breaks down
completely. Conrad had a model for Kurtz,55 but he was not required
to tether his fictional creation to the flesh-and-blood model that
originally inspired him. Everyone understands this to some degree.
The Belgian officer of the Katanga Company who was the inspiration
for Kurtz was evidently a very bad man,56 but no one would consider
actually executing him on the authority of Conrad's portrait. The
novelists' allegiance is to the artistic truth of the characters they have
created. The artists' power grows from that allegiance, not from
meticulous efforts to describe the external world. For a novelist, there
is a moment at which "resemblance fades, invention, imagination, the
creative instinct-whatever you like to call it-takes over."57 Besides,
in pursuing the artistic truth, a novelist has no reason to care whether
his readers dislike his character, even wish him dead.5"
52. RAYMOND WILLIAMS, GEORGE ORWELL 51 (1971) (citing George Orwell, Shooting an
Elephant, in 1 THE COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL 235-
42 (Ian Angus & Sonia Orwell eds., 1968)).
53. Lyon, supra note 10, at 705.
54. Quoted in ANTHONY POWELL, FACES IN MY TIME 97 (1982).
55. See NORMAN SHERRY, CONRAD'S WESTERN WORLD 95-124 (1966) (discussing Conrad's
Heart of Darkness).
56. Id.
57. ANTHONY POWELL, MESSENGERS OF DAY 60 (1978).
58. The effect of this difference between the advocates' and the artists' perspectives is well
illustrated by a conflict between Millard Farmer, a revered capital defense lawyer, and Tim
Robbins, the director of the film DEAD MAN WALKING (Polygram Films 1995). Both men are
death penalty opponents, but Robbins enraged Farmer by portraying his death row inmate as
a racist and an anti-Semite. In Farmer's version of their conversation:
The conversation about the movie script continued with Farmer attempting to persuade
Tim the director, and Tim the person, to remove the anti-Semitic and racist remarks made
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Few lawyers possess the talents of Joseph Conrad, but some lawyers
might. My point is that even Conrad's talents could not ensure that
lawyers' portraits of actual defendants would be reliable repre-
sentations for a jury in the death penalty context. The mark of the
artist is the ability to make something new from the raw material of
experience. A novelist is creating a reality, not representing one.59
Literary power will increase the chances of a life verdict; that is not
the same thing as increasing the transparency of the relationship
between the original defendant and the lawyers' copy. In fact, the
more one thinks about applying literary talent or technique to
representing a capital defendant, the less "transparent" the sentencing
process seems.
IV. RACE AND REPRESENTATION:
EVIDENCE OF THINGS UNSAID
At every stage of the capital punishment process, from the decision
to seek the death penalty to the decision to impose it, African-
Americans are particularly likely to be selected for execution. Their
defense lawyers face specific challenges, for the task of representing
African-American defendants does not begin with a clean slate.
Before his capital trial even starts, an African-American defendant is
awash in the "transpersonal, transhuman, and transcultural" forces to
which Edward Said refers.' A history of prejudice and stereotype
by the death row inmate character. The movie character, Robbins explained, was not going
to have the name of a real death row inmate and, besides, the real death row inmate had,
according to the book, used such words. Farmer argued that the issue was beside the point.
He knew the real death row inmate being protrayed. Farmer knew that the light in which
Robbins was portraying the inmate's conduct was both unfair and unrepresentative of the
many death row inmates Farmer has known and represented.... Robbins countered that
movies have to create an impression in a short period of time.
Millard Farmer et al., Death Is Different: Reducing the Politically Acceptable Correct Executions,
THE CHAMPION, Nov. 1995, at 6, 9. In recent work, Professor Nussbaum acknowledges that
negative traits of the sort that novelists rely upon are as "human" as positive ones. For lawyers
they will be less useful, even dangerous. NUSSBAUM, supra note 36, at 94. For example, in her
discussion of Richard Wright's novel Native Son, Nussbaum points to many elements of Bigger
Thomas's situation that make Bigger more understandable but could also seem to jurors to make
him a permanent, insoluble danger. Id. at 93-97.
59. See Criticism, supra note 17, at 198-200. William Simon argues that the creation of
fictitious client-figures is an endemic tendency in adversary advocacy. See William Simon,
Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29. For a
sensitive account of the temptations that stereotypes present to defense lawyers, see Eva S.
Nilsen, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1 (1994).
60. See Representing the Colonized, supra note 2. On the issue of discrimination in capital
cases and in criminal justice in general, see generally SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO,
DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989). See also
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Norval Morris, Race and Crime: What Evidence Is
There That Race Influences Results in the Criminal Justice System?, 72 JUDICATURE 111 (1988).
For excellent historical studies of race in operation in the capital punishment system, see ERIC
W. RISE, THE MARTINSVILLE SEVEN: RACE, RAPE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1993); GEORGE
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pervades the process. How do defense lawyers try to free their client
from this heritage?
It may help illuminate both the specific challenges of representing
Black defendants and the more general question of representation in
capital trials if I describe two art exhibitions, staged concurrently, that
investigated the question of race and representation: the Museum of
Modem Art's Jacob Lawrence: The Migration Series,61 and the
Whitney Museum's Black Male: Representations of Masculinity in
Contemporary American Art.62
Jacob Lawrence painted The Migration of the Negro in 1940 and
1941. The series consists of 60 panels of uniform size, painted in
bright colors and simplified, exaggerated forms reminiscent of Matisse
or Picasso. A short caption accompanies each painting. The series,
from the first panel ("During World War I there was a great
migration north by southern African Americans") to the last ("The
migrants kept coming"), presents the grand historical narrative of the
African-American experience from the First World War until the
beginning of the Second. It includes pictorial accounts of poverty,
lynching, railway journeys, and work in the stockyards and steel mills,
organized into a series of storyboards. If the Migration Series were
extended backward in time, it would include captivity and slavery;63
if it were extended forward into our own era, it would include the
deindustrialization of the cities,' the disintegration of the family, the
breakdown of the urban educational system, the plague of drugs.6"
The Migration Series presents in panorama the shared heritage of
African Americans as a group: Its subject is the larger social context
of each African American's life.
The Whitney's exhibit, Black Male: Representations of Masculinity
in Contemporary American Art, focuses on one aspect of that shared
heritage: the fact that African Americans, since their arrival in this
country, have seen "tens of thousands of the most heinous represen-
tations of black people, on children's games, portable savings banks,
trade cards, postcards, calendars, tea cosies, napkins ... nothing but
images of black people devoid of reason, simian or satanic in ap-
C. WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY: LYNCHINGS, MOB RULE, AND "LEGAL
LYNCHINGS" (1990).
61. Thirty of the Migration paintings belong to the Museum of Modem Art, thirty to the
Phillips Collection. The entire series is published in JACOB LAWRENCE: THE MIGRATION
SERIES (1994) [hereinafter MIGRATION].
62. BLACK MALE: REPRESENTATIONS OF MASCULINITY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
ART (Thelma Golden ed., 1994) [hereinafter WHITNEY CATALOGUE].
63. See generally EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES
MADE (1973).
64. See generally NICHOLAS LEMAN, THE PROMISED LAND (1992).
65. See generally ELLIOT CURRIE, RECKONING (1993).
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pearance, and slothful, lustful, or lascivious in nature., 66 The
Whitney exhibit is organized around the recognition that the
experience of being represented by others is a central feature of
African-American life. Thelma Golden, Black Male's curator, quotes
an essay by Kobena Mercer to explain the exhibit's rationale:
Overrepresented in statistics on homicide and suicide, mis-
represented in the media as the personification of drugs, disease
and crime, such invisible men, like their all-too-visible counter-
parts, suggest that black masculinity is not merely a social
identity in crisis. It is also a key site of ideological representation,
a site upon which the nation's crisis comes to be dramatized,
demonized, and dealt with .... 67
And so, Black Male surveys the representations of Black men that
have bombarded us over the past thirty years.
68
Juxtaposition of these exhibitions makes three things clear. First,
contemporary American culture contains only a very rudimentary
assortment of images of Black men. The menu sometimes seems to
include only a Manichean selection of Good Blacks and Bad
Blacks-Bill Cosby and Willie Horton.69 Second, this poverty of
images can have enormous social consequences, especially in forensic
settings. 70 There is no reason to hope that jurors are immune to the
power of the representations of Black men that pervade our culture.
Representations of Rodney King play a prominent role in Black Male.
The video of the helpless King being beaten senseless plays con-
tinuously: What could seem more reliable than a video tape? But
Black Male also anatomizes the ways in which the video was removed
from its historical context during the trial of the police officers
involved.71 Once this dehistoricization was accomplished, the all-
66. Henry Louis Gates, Preface, in WHITNEY CATALOGUE, supra note 61, at 11. See
generally ALBERT BOIME, THE ART OF EXCLUSION: REPRESENTING BLACKS IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY (1990); 4 HUGH HONOUR, THE IMAGE OF THE BLACK IN WESTERN
ART (1989); BELL HOOKS, BLACK LOOKS: RACE AND REPRESENTATION (1992). See also Henry
Louis Gates, The Trope of the New Negro and the Reconstruction of the Image of the Black, 14
REPRESENTATIONS 129-56 (1988).
67. Kobena Mercer, Engendered Species: Danny Tisdale and Keith Piper, 30 ARTFORUM 75
(1992), quoted in WHITNEY CATALOGUE, supra note 61, at 19.
68. The portraits on display include Willie Horton, Robert Mapplethorpe's objectified nudes,
entertainment and sports icons from Michael Jordan to Bill Cosby, the "Central Park Wolfpack,"
"blaxploitation" fantasy figures such as Shaft and Superfly, Malcolm X, gangsta' rappers, and
a host of others.
69. Professor Adeno Addis reports an instance of this dichotomy from the floor of Congress:
A Congressman announced that Nelson Mandela was not Martin Luther King; (therefore) he
was Willie Horton. Adeno Addis, Hell, Man, They Did Invent Us: The Mass Media, Law and
African Americans, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 523, 561 n.130 (1993).
70. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Trials, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1739 (1993).
71. Elizabeth Alexander, "Can You Be Black and Look at This": Reading the Rodney King
Video(s), in WHITNEY CATALOGUE, supra note 61, at 91.
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white jury resorted to the traditional images of the Black male in
America. These images-"buffed-out," "probable ex-con," "like a
wounded animal"-were effectively marshalled by the lawyers for the
Los Angeles police.72 As Elizabeth Alexander writes in an essay in
the exhibition catalogue, "[C]odes erased Rodney King's individual
bodily history within the event itself as well as a collective African-
American bodily history, and supplanted it with a myth of white male
victimization. 73 Finally, correcting this situation requires (among
other things) restoring the larger historical context to the person
represented. The images displayed in the Black Male exhibition look
entirely different to someone who understands (for example, through
the Migration Series) the facts of the collective historical narrative
than to someone who has never heard that narrative. The survival of
the contemporary Willie Horton stereotype of the African-American
man-powerful, dangerous, indifferent to pain-that led to the
acquittal of King's assailants depends on ignorance of the fact that the
history of the Black man in America is characterized by lynchings,
beatings, and physical victimization. The African-American male's
history is one of profound vulnerability and insecurity. The Whitney
exhibition economically underlines this point by bracketing the
Rodney King materials with references to slave narratives of
whippings and the image of Emmett Till in his coffin.74 Had the Simi
Valley jury seen King in this context, it would not have been easy to
agree that an 81-second beating by four armed officers was just
necessary police work.
My point is not that artists' representations are always and neces-
sarily "better" than others. Obviously, they are not. Black Male
proves again and again (for example, through the Mapplethorpe
materials) that artists' images can be both attractive and destructive.
Works of art, after all, are produced by specific people in specific
contexts, and neither the individuals nor the contexts are immune to
the power dynamics and stereotypes that affect representation. My
point is that artists can enrich and correct prevailing stereotypes if
they choose. An artist has the power to imagine the Whitney images
with the Lawrence series. This power has sweeping potential. The
Whitney curators' gallery of Superflys, Mapplethorpian objects, and
glaring gangsta' rappers provides a critical commentary on the
problem of representation because the exhibition's curators, many of
its artists, and most of its public know the historical narrative of the
72. Id. at 68.
73. Id
74. Id. at 102.
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Migration Series. But will the sentencing jury? If they do not, can the
lawyers inform them?
Defense lawyers at a capital sentencing can never represent their
client by using the Bill Cosby stereotype, so they must confront the
astonishing confluence of social forces driving the jury towards
society's default representation of the defendant: namely, Willie
Horton. As Tricia Rose points out,
The white American public, many of whom only tangentially
know any young black men personally, has been inundated with
images of young black men who appear fully invested in a life of
violent crime, who have participated in drug-related gang shoot-
outs and other acts of violence for "no apparent reason.
It is a general axiom of social psychology that members of any "out
group" will tend to look the same to members of "in groups. 1176
Young Black men can accelerate this process by adopting a "hard"
pose, by dressing, talking, and looking as much alike as they can-to
outside eyes. (Teenagers do this everywhere, at every time: Disad-
vantaged teenagers are even more likely to conceal the "full
transcript" of their lives behind a group mask.)77 The conventions of
the commercial mass media-in both its news and entertainment
aspects-treat the essential difference, distance, and uniformity of
inner-city Black men as permanent facts of nature.78. Can good capital defense lawyers cure this situation by restoring the
historical narrative to the courtroom? Can they, in effect, use The
Migration Series to reconstruct some sense of shared societal respon-
sibility for the acts of a Black male and trump the Willie Horton
stereotype? It is not theoretically impossible. Certainly jurors are
bombarded by the same biases and stereotypes as everyone else, but
the forum of a jury trial can be a promising venue for transcending
stereotypes. The real cure for stereotyped thinking is not the
substitution of a different stereotype but a new way of looking at the
world.79 A jury trial, because of its intense concentration on the
clinical details of a unique set of facts, might promote just that new
way of seeing. 0 Unfortunately, a very broad array of practical
75. Tricia Rose, Rap Music and the Demonization of Young Black Males, in WHITNEY
CATALOGUE, supra note 61, at 153.
76. See generally RICHARD MAJORS & JANET MANCINI BILLSON, COOL POSE: THE
DILEMMAS OF BLACK MANHOOD IN AMERICA (1992).
77. Rose, supra note 75, at 154.
78. See generally Addis, supra note 69; James M. Doyle, Into The Eight Ball: The
Colonialists' Landscape In American Criminal Justice, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 65 (1992).
79. See generally ERICH FROMM & T.W. ADORNO, THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY
(1952).
80. James M. Doyle, The Innocent Black Defendant Two Stories, 1 RECONSTRUCTION 132,
134-35 (1992).
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courtoom considerations will constrain the best lawyers' ability to
integrate Jacob Lawrence into their representations.
To begin with, there is the fantastic unwieldiness of the operation.
Lawrence took 60 panels to portray the migration between the two
wars; to bring the narrative up to date would take at least 60 more.
And Lawrence needed 60 panels to produce his effect. Much of the
power of the Migration Series derives from the cumulative impact of
these 60 discrete images, each memorializing a single, inarguable fact.
Any effort to compress the narrative forfeits this power. A Lawrence
painting illustrating "They were very poor," or "The migrants arrived
in Pittsburgh, one of the great industrial centers of the North" cannot
be disputed. Trying to make things more complex opens the door to
a "Yes, but . . . " response. Where do you find a witness to testify to
these things? Where do you find a judge who will sit still for it? More
inclusive rules of relevance govern the admissibility of evidence at the
sentencing phase of a capital trial, but questions of relevance are still
left to the discretion of the trial judge.81 Many trial judges, oblivious
to the fact that racial imagery pervades the process even without
specific mention, will be hostile to the substance of the presentation:
They will see it as an unwarranted effort to "inject race" into a trial
that was about, e.g., a liquor store hold-up, not a civil rights
demonstration. Even judges who are willing to permit historical
background presentation are very likely to limit its scope and dictate
its form. The lawyers will not have the artists' absolute freedom to
define their work.
This is a crucial difference. Defense lawyers will be acutely
conscious of the fact that a partial presentation of the Lawrence
materials will be much worse than no presentation at all. Deprived of
the magisterial sweep of Lawrence's medium, the lawyers' version
runs the danger of alienating the jurors entirely. The penalty phase of
a capital trial is always a delicate balancing act. A factor like race or
mental illness can be used to explain a defendant's crime, but the
smallest slip could be catastrophic. Everything is lost if the jury
(having just convicted the defendant of murder) interprets the use of
mitigating material as an attempt to excuse the murder or evade
responsibililty s2 Using the Lawrence materials inartfully threatens
to do just that: to display a murderer whining about his victimization.
It seems to ask the jurors not only to excuse the defendant but also
to excuse en masse all members of the thoroughly demonized group
to which he belongs. An incomplete version of the Lawrence
81. See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 481 U.S. 216 (1987).
82. See Geimer, supra note 10, at 288-89, 294.
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materials will seem to be an effort not only to shed a measure of
responsibility, but also to impose it on the community embodied by
the jury itself.
Furthermore, the lawyers know that they cannot construct their
account of the Migration in the privacy of their studio; they have to
do it in the presence of a hostile prosecutor. Defense lawyers might
hope only to add a dimension to their representation by including the
Lawrence materials, but the prosecutor will immediately seize on the
Lawrence materials as if they were the whole defense representation,
not a supplement. Defense lawyers considering a presentation of the
Migration story and its sequels will have these probable responses
ringing in their ears.
The prosecutors' caricature of the Lawrence materials will include
a number of potentially devastating points: (1) "He still hasn't
accepted responsibility for his crime," (2) "This means he will kill
again," (3) "He blames America, not himself," (4) "The defense
slanders the millions of Black Americans who don't kill," (5) "Accept
this excuse, and you will slander them too." There are answers to
these assertions, of course, but defense lawyers weighing the benefits
of presenting a truncated version of the societal responsibility
narrative subject to refutation by these prosecutorial attacks will
almost certainly decide that the benefits of the Lawrence materials are
not worth the costs.
At best, the laborious and dangerous efforts to include the broad
historical narrative will produce only a schematic version that, far
from "humanizing" the defendant, will drive him deeper and deeper
into the default identity assigned to the despised group to which he
belongs. If good lawyers use the Lawrence narrative at all they will
use it covertly, subliminally-in ways that are immune to adversary
cooptation-and thereby run the very substantial risk that they will
fail to communicate the story at all. In all likelihood, the narrative of
general societal responsibility will play no visible part in the represen-
tation of the defendant that the defense constructs.
Students of representation would argue that such a representation
is not only futile; it is false.83 Derek Walcott makes this point in an
astringent review of V.S. Naipaul's The Enigma of Arrival:
[If the Trinidadians] have neither Art nor Culture, neither flower
gardens nor venerable elms it is because none of that was given
83. See, e.g., id. at 294-95 ("When jurors and the public appropriately reject absolute
determinism, they commonly choose unlimited accountability, an equally flawed
theory... capital defendants did not spring full blown onto the earth at the moment of their
crimes."). See generally Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal
Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 2245 (1992).
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to the slave or indentured worker. To write of this lack as though
it were the fault of the African or Indian is not only to betray
them but to lie.84
Robin West, writing about the Supreme Court's death penalty
opinions, notes that representations that are silent on the historical
question
underscore rather than challenge the tendency to view the
defendant as well as the act as inhuman, and thus to discharge
him from the human community. The lack of an articulated
narrative of shared responsibility for his criminality ultimately has
the utterly predictable consequence of validating our desire to
deny not only our shared responsibility for the defendant's
violence, but our responsibility for the defendant's fate as well.
• . [S]ilence validates our societal self-delusion that the capital
defendant's fate is not inextricably linked, through chains of
causation, responsibility, commonality and community, with our
own.
85
It is impossible to say whether the inclusion of African-American
history in the representations of African-American capital defendants
would save many of their lives. Given the state of race relations in
this country, it probably would not. Even if including the his-
torical/social frame would help, courtroom reality is such that good
lawyers cannot effectively include that historical narrative in their
representations anyway, and probably should not try. Yet if they do
not, the Willie Horton stereotype will survive. Whatever that means
84. Derek Walcott, The Garden Path, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 13, 1987, at 27-31
(reviewing V.S. NAIPUL, THE ENIGMA OF ARRIVAL (1987)).
85. West, supra note 26, at 170. By using the term "societal responsibility" I do not believe
Professor West means (and certainly I do not mean) to imply societal involvement in sinister
activity that creates societal criminal responsibility, only that many social decisions have
consequences that fall unpredictably on society's members. The fact that some people are
exposed to lead paint poisoning, some to malnutrition, some to inadequate protection against
intrafamily abuse, and others to destructive public mental health systems, results from societal
arrangements, even though these exposures were not intended and are sincerely regretted by
those responsible. For a brilliant exposition that simultaneously takes an unsparing view of a
particular criminal and places him in the overall cultural and historical context, see FOX
BUTrERFIELD, ALL GOD'S CHILDREN: THE BOSKET FAMILY AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION
OF VIOLENCE (1995). In compiling his portrait of Willie Bosket, "[t]he most violent criminal in
New York State history" (according to the jacket copy), Butterfield relies on many of the
documents I have discussed: probation reports, psychological evaluations, and accounts by family
members. But Butterfield also attempts to integrate Bosket's story with his family history and
to assess the impact on the family of slavery, and of the atmosphere of violence and obsession
with "honor" that governed the region of South Carolina in which the family lived. To read
Butterfield's book is to understand both how much insight might be gained by taking the
comprehensive, historical approach advocated by Professor West and why it would seem to be
madness for a lawyer defending a capital case to choose that approach. Another example of the
light that an understanding of societal conditions can shed on an individual human is provided
by Martha Nussbaum's discussion of the portrait of Bigger Thomas in Richard Wright's Native
Son (1943). NUSSBAUM, supra note 36, at 93-98.
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for the fate of the defendants, what it means for the community is
very clear. The jurors will make their decisions based on a represen-
tation with something essential missing, because effective lawyers will
avoid the historical material in fashioning their representation. Thus,
their representation may be more attractive, more worthy of mercy,
but it will also be incomplete.
V. ACTING CRAZY: REPRESENTING MENTAL ILLNESS
Authorities estimate that approximately half of the inmates on
death row suffer from mental illness and that ten to 20 percent are
mentally retarded.86 When neurologist Dorothy Lewis examined
fourteen juveniles on death row in 1989, she found that "every one of
them had multiple handicaps, including various levels of neurological
dysfunction and severe psychopathologies." s Professor White reports
a leading capital defense lawyer's belief that "it's a rare case in which
the capital defendant has no mental problems.,
88
The Supreme Court has closely scrutinized the role of mental
disability evidence in capital sentencing. Mental health is the area of
mitigation in which the Court has tried hardest to clarify Gregg v.
Georgia's requirement that sentencing be individualized.89 Beginning
with Eddings v. Oklahoma' and progressing through Penry v.
Lynaugh9 1 and Boyde v. California,92 the Court has struggled to
outline the ways in which mental illness is constitutionally relevant to
a death penalty proceeding. It is also the area in which the Court-in
Riggins v. Nevada-most clearly indicated a belief that the right to in-
dividualized sentencing has a mimetic component: It includes a right
to "represent" a defendant's individual predicament without state
interference.9
A few days after Riggins' arrest for murder he told a psychiatrist
that he was hearing voices and having trouble sleeping.9" Riggins
advised the doctor that an antipsychotic medication, Mellaril, had
helped him in the past. Mellaril was prescribed and the dosage
gradually increased to a level that one psychiatrist testified was
"toxic." Before trial, the defense moved for an order discontinuing the
86. White, supra note 10, at 338.
87. Dorothy 0. Lewis et al., Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational and Family Characteristics
of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United States, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 584, 588
(1988).
88. White, supra note 10, at 339.
89. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
90. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
91. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
92. 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
93. Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992).
94. Id. at 1812.
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medication, arguing that since the defense intended to present an
insanity defense, Riggins was entitled to appear before the jury in his
"true mental state."95 This motion was denied. Thereafter, a
medicated Riggins was convicted and sentenced to death. On appeal,
he claimed that the forced medication affected his "attitude, ap-
pearance and demeanor" at trial. The Nevada Supreme Court upheld
the conviction and sentence, reasoning that Riggins' rights were not
violated because he was permitted to introduce expert testimony
explaining to the jurors the effects of Mellaril on his demeanor.9
6
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court found that efforts to prove
or disprove actual prejudice from the record would be futile: The
impact of the defendant's medicated demeanor on the jurors was
impossible to discern from the trial transcript.9 Justice Kennedy
enlarged on this point in a concurring opinion:
The prejudice can be acute during the sentencing phase of the
proceedings, when the sentencer must attempt to know the heart
and mind of the offender and judge his character, his contrition
or its absence, and his future dangerousness. In a capital
sentencing proceeding, assessments of character and remorse may
carry great weight, and perhaps, be determinative of whether the
offender lives or dies.98
In effect, the Riggins case holds that if you claim that you are
mentally ill, the state cannot deprive you of your ability to "act crazy"
at trial. The Riggins opinion gives constitutional protection to the
option of representing the defendant by enacting mental illness
theatrically, rather than by simply explaining it verbally. The case
seems to suggest that if the ideal defense lawyer has the phar-
macological expertise to manipulate the dosage to just the right effect
(within the range of medical safety), he has the license to do so. How
will capital defense lawyers use this freedom to convey a represen-
tation to the jurors? How will this freedom contribute to in-
dividualized sentencing and "transparent" representation?
Capital defense lawyers do not have complete freedom in the area
of mental disability. While race is a topic characterized by things that
cannot be said in constructing a representation, mental disability is an
area characterized by things that cannot be allowed to go unsaid. The
problem for defense lawyers in a race-driven case is to find an
antidote for the forces that confine their clients within existing,
unambiguously dangerous, stereotypes. The problem for lawyers
95. Id.
96. d. at 1813.
97. Id. at 1816.
98. Id. at 1819-20.
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defending the mentally ill is to resist the forces that bend their
representation toward caricatures that are superficially helpful, but
ultimately hollow and unavailing.
To begin with, the language of many state statutes will drive the
lawyers' portrait in the direction of specific levels or varieties of
disability. In Georgia, for example, a mentally retarded defendant is
protected from the death penalty,99 while a schizophrenic defendant
may, or may not be.' ° In addition, various state definitions of
"mitigating circumstances" speak in terms of "substantial" or
"extreme" mental problems. 1 Even if the statutes did not exert this
influence toward categorization, the jurors' attitudes would. Research
resoundingly proves that there is a yawning gap between what mental
health professionals will diagnose as mental disability and what jurors
(or judges) will accept as a mitigating condition."° According to one
study, many people see the insanity defense as a sham because they
insist on a "near total lack of comprehension" as an insanity stan-
dard. 3 In a careful study of the issue Michael Perlin notes that
"[j]urors 'look for bizarre acts, sudden episodes, a defendant's genuine
obliviousness to his own best concerns, and a pervasive inability to
lead an ordinary life."' 1
Many mentally disabled people show a range of symptoms, and
some very ill people will show few symptoms at all. For many
mentally ill and retarded people, the fact that they can, from time to
time, show some ability to lead an ordinary life is a proud
achievement.0 5 The level of functioning of most people with mental
disabilities presents a moving target: Certain people function better
on some days, or at some dosages, or in some environments. But any
lawyer who attempts to represent his mentally ill client in light of
achievements as well as handicaps will create a representation
inconsistent with the jurors' confident belief that they know a sick
person when they see one, 106 and they see one when the defendant
conforms to the image of "a raving maniac or complete imbecile.
' 1°7
99. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (c)(3), (j) (Michie 1990).
100. Spraggins v. State, 364 S.E.2d 861 (Ga. 1988).
101. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(1), (G)(2) (1989).
102. See generally Deana Logan, Is It Mitigation or Aggravation? Troublesome Areas of
Defense Evidence in Capital Sentencing, CAL. ArT'ys FOR CRIM. JUST. F., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at
18; Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of
"Mitigating" Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 239 (1994).
103. Valerie Hans & Dan Slater, "Plain Crazy": Lay Definitions of Legal Insanity, 7 INT'L
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 105, 111 (1984).
104. Perlin, supra note 102, at 269.
105. SUSAN SHEENAN, IS THERE No PLACE ON EARTH FOR ME? (1982).
106. See generally SANDER GILMAN, SEEING THE INSANE (1982).
107. Jones v. State, 289 So. 2d 725, 729 (Fla. 1974).
28
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol8/iss2/3
Doyle
Even worse, there is no safe middle ground. Evidence of mental
illness is double-edged: It provides some mitigation for the defen-
dant's crime but it also proves to most jurors that the defendant will
be dangerous in the future. Lawyers who introduce evidence of
mental illness without successfully conforming to the jurors' lay vision
of insanity have done more than miss an opportunity; they have af-
firmatively wounded their client.
Thus, there will be enormous pressures on defense lawyers to craft
a representation that earns the defendant membership in a preexis-
ting, stereotypical category of "acute" or "extreme" illness, and to
show that he fits into that category all of the time-that he is all
sickness, no function. If you want to raise mental health at all, you
had better be prepared to go for broke. The jury's choice is not
between "insane" and "not insane"; it is between "insane" and
"dangerous but not insane." If the jury chooses the latter, the
defendant may be sentenced to death. Thus, the defendant must enact
illness, but only as a character role, a "furioso," a conventional figure
of madness.
Consider these forces at work in the case of Charles Silagy.108
Silagy brutally stabbed and killed his girlfriend and his roommate.
Silagy was interviewed by three psychiatrists before trial and
represented himself to the psychiatrists as a traumatized veteran of
the Vietnam War. One psychiatrist reported:
He served a total of 19 months in Vietnam.... In combat ... he
was exposed to a great deal of violence. He killed many of the
enemy, both at a distance and close-up. He says that on several
occasions he killed people with knives, sometimes by cutting their
heads off. He says he was captured by the enemy three times and
was subjected to torture. He says that he was also subjected to
interrogation by our side .... [H]e also participated in torturing
the enemy .... [H]e participated in the My Lai massacre ...
109
Silagy's lawyer duly collected this representation and naturally tried
to emphasize it at trial while creating a representation of his own.
Counsel offered the jury a representation of Silagy as a combat-
scarred, post-traumatic stress victim who "had an awful lot of
exposure to violence that most people don't have and [this was] a
significant factor in the psychological makeup."' n He did this rather
cleverly, by inserting the combat-trauma information, over the
prosecutor's objections, during the cross-examination of one of the
108. Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1642 (1994).
109. 905 F.2d at 1001.
110. Id. at 1002.
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state's psychiatrists.' Silagy's insanity defense failed. At the penalty
phase Silagy fired his lawyer, proceeded pro se, and asked for the
death penalty. The jurors granted his request. In short, everyone
behaved as might be expected in a process of representation. Silagy,
interviewed by professionals who he knew had him in their power,
told them his story. Because the Illinois statute defined mitigating
circumstances in terms of "extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance,"" 2 Silagy's lawyer strove for the most acutely deranged
representation of his client he could hope to support.
Years later, during the course of the post-conviction attack on
Silagy's sentence, Silagy revealed that his account of his Vietnam
experience was a fabrication. He had been in Vietnam, but he had
worked as a clerk and a tracked-vehicle repair man.' The represen-
tation that Silagy's lawyer presented to the jurors was a complete
fantasy. Judge Kanne, writing to affirm the sentence, sardonically
points out the irony of the fix in which Silagy (with the help of his
unwitting lawyer) has placed himself: "In sum, it was Petitioner's own
efforts to disguise the facts which led to false information being
elicited by his own counsel. Moreover, Petitioner had an adequate
opportunity to respond to the inaccurate nature of the infor-
mation. '
Now, this seems fair enough when you are in the habit of seeing
any trial procedure as a zero-sum battle of adversaries, but view this
situation from the perspective of the jurors (or the community they
embody) and it does not seem quite so satisfactory."5 With the
benefit of Silagy's recantation, we know more than the jurors. Even
so, all we really know is who Silagy is not-namely, the stereotype of
a combat-scarred, post-traumatic stress victim. Did the jurors decide
Silagy's "true" representation? Did they believe the combat saga and
not consider it mitigating? Who is Silagy? An execution is as powerful
a normative message as our system offers. But what will executing
Silagy say? The jurors have been asked to send a man to his death,
but if Silagy's sentence is carried out, the man who is executed-at
least if he possesses any reality that cannot be inferred from the
circumstances of his crimes-will be a stranger to the jurors who
condemmed him.
111. Id.
112. ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 38, 1 9-1(a) (Smith-Hurd 1979).
113. 905 F.2d at 1003 n.12.
114. Id. at 1004.
115. John Griffins, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a "Third Model" of the Criminal
Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970) (disputing conception of criminal process as "zero sum" battle
of irreconcilables).
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It would be wrong to write about this subject without recognizing
the harrowing burdens that the best capital defense lawyers-the
lawyers Professor White cites-have accepted. Lawyers such as
Stephen Bright or Andrea Lyon, who write and speak to compel their
profession to confront the ineffective lawyering characteristic of
capital cases, must be painfully aware of the problematics of repre-
sentation that affect their own cases. 16 They know their clients very
well; they know the versions of their clients that they laboriously
piece together; they cannot help but know the difference between the
two. Their silence on this point is evidence of stoicism, not a lack of
insight. Imagine accepting responsibility for the decision to portray
your client as retarded because it might increase his chances for
mercy, when you know that the increase is marginal, and that the
stigma (in the client's eyes) is terribly painful. Imagine the conver-
sation in which you explain the decision to your client. Imagine
waiting for the verdict.
When they wring what advantage they can from the existing
adversary system, or help Professor White with tactical advice, the
best defense lawyers are following Thurgood Marshall's credo, "Do
the best you can with what you've got.""' 7 But what they have is an
adversary system that inevitably functions as a grammar of signs and
social conventions no less troubled by the problem of representation
than any other.
Capital defense lawyers must defend their client by putting forward
a representation. Ordinarily, they are compelled to choose a particular
representation, to commit themselves to it, to convey only that one
representation, and as forcefully as possible. The representation that
emerges will not be the product of this one, large strategic choice but
of hundreds, even thousands, of smaller tactical decisions. Emphasize
this point? Or that one? Is this detail vivid enough? Too vivid? Call
this teacher to testify, or that one? A trial is a psychologically dense,
complex event. Trial advocates' representations of their client will not
be straightforward exposition; they will involve rhetorical devices,"1
effects of light and shadow, bits of stage business.'19 A point arrives
at which the process of representation leaves the lawyers' hands and
is submitted to the interpretive efforts of the jurors, adding an entirely
116. See, e.g., Mello, supra note 38, at 912.
117. Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1217, 1219 (1992).
118. See Amsterdam & Hertz, supra note 22.
119. See Lyon, supra note 10.
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new level of complexity." ° Some lawyers will handle all of this very
skillfully.
As Steven Marcus notes, however: "[R]epresentations remain ines-
capably fictions or imaginations, and there is no easy way out of this
epistemological puzzle, whatever our perspective or whatever
linguistic means or conceptual devices we use in our constructions or
imaginations of the social world." '121 A transparent relationship
between the lawyers' portrait of the defendant and the defendant
himself cannot be expected in adversary sentencing proceedings. If
such a relationship appears, the appearance will be adventitious. It
will be a rare case in which any party to the proceedings is even trying
to create a transparent representation. Refractions of the sort I have
been describing-radical and invalidating differences among the
defendant who murdered, the representation of the defendant that
was judged, and the prisoner who is executed-are probably
inevitable, certainly pandemic.12
For some judges and commentators, this is perfectly acceptable. For
them what matters, in the end, is the murder, and so long as guilt is
proven, the balance of the process of representation is largely beside
the point. Whatever one might think of this as a prescription, students
of the process of representation would argue that this view offers a
more plausible description of how we actually sentence people to
death than does the Lockett-Eddings rhetoric of individualized
sentencing. Our procedures for determining the fact of a murder and
the identity of a murderer are not perfect,"2 but they are many
120. See generally STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1975).
121. MARCUS, supra note 39, at ix.
122. Among the functions of a good capital lawyer is the preservation of the appellate
record, a function that, when performed well, will lay the foundations for years of appellate
litigation. Frequently, during the appellate period, the character of the defendant grows more
and more distant from the representation of the defendant presented at the trial. Accounts of
death row life frequently describe inmates whose personalities have become almost unrecog-
nizable during their years on death row. See, e.g., DAVID VON DREHLE, AMONG THE LOWEST
OF THE DEAD 130-32 (1995); JOSEPH INGLE, LAST RIGHTS (1990); ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH
WORK: A STUDY OF THE MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS (1990); HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN
WALKING (1993).
The discontinuities that ordinary growth and maturity can create between representation and
execution are illustrated by comparing the portraits of Christopher Burger contained in the
various judicial opinions reviewing his trial and Professor Phyllis Goldfarb's account of Burger's
last days. Compare Burger v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 930 (11th Cir. 1985) and Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S.
776 (1987) with Goldfarb, supra note 35. If Goldfarb's portrait is reliable, it would seem to
indicate that the trial court representation of Burger was always a grotesque caricature. But
whether that is true or not, the second portrait certainly demonstrates that the first was fully
obsolete by the time of the execution.
123. See MICHAEL C. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVIC-
TIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (1994). Research now proves that even varieties of evidence that had
previously been considered very reliable are actually problematic. See generally ELIZABETH F.
LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (2d ed. 1992);
Saul Kassin & Karlyn McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions: Communicating Promises
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times more dependable than the only procedure we have for
representing the murderer independently of his act; perhaps we
should admit as much. Then what?
An enquiry into the nature of representation in capital sentencing
might suggest a standard that limits the scope of death eligibility.
Judge Alex Kozinski, a conservative member of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, recently suggested that the
enormous costs in dollars and delay imposed by the current broad
applicability of the death penalty were no longer supportable, and
that the death penalty should be retained, but reserved for a few of
the "most serious" crimes, such as murder-for-hire, or terrorist
killings.124 What makes a particular crime "most serious" will be
difficult if not impossible to articulate. But it may be argued that a
murder-for-hire or a terrorist killing contributes more to a "reliable"
representation of the defendant than, for example, a drive-by shooting
or a domestic killing. The degree of calculation involved in murder-
for-hire may or may not make it more "serious"; it will usually,
however, make it more representative, and perhaps a more reliable
beginning to a sentencing process.
Ultimately, however, such a limitation will marginally decrease the
incidence of the problem without meeting its fundamental challenge.
Serious study of the operation of representation in capital sentencing
can indicate that the adversary system-not when it is in "breakdown"
but when it operates as expected-is incapable of producing the
reliable and individualized sentencing on which, according to Gregg
v. Georgia and its progeny, the legitimacy of the death penalty
depends. If by "effective" assistance in capital sentencing we mean
contribution to a reliable, individualized portrait of the defendant,
then capital sentencing is a context in which "the likelihood that any
lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance
is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without
inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial."1" The structural
realities of a capital trial prevent the individualized sentencing that
the Eighth Amendment requires.
and Threats by Pragmatic Implication, 15 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 233 (1991).
124. Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, The Death Penalty's Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,
1995, at Al.
125. United States v. Cronic, 446 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1984).
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